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Introduction.During the 2014–2016West-AfricanEbola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, someHCWs fromWestern countries became
infected despite proper equipment and training on EVD infection prevention and control (IPC) standards. Despite their high
awareness toward EVD, some of them could not recall the transmission routes.We explored these incidents by recalling the stories of
infectedWestern HCWs who had no known directly exposures to blood/bodily fluids from EVD patients.Methodology.We carried
out conventional and unconventional literature searches through the web using the keyword “Ebola” looking for interviews and
reports released by the infected HCWs and/or the healthcare organizations. Results.We identified fourteen HCWs, some infected
outsideWest Africa and some even classified at low EVD risk. None of them recalled accidents, unintentional exposures, or any IPC
violation. Infection transmission was thus inexplicable through the acknowledged transmission routes.Conclusions.We formulated
two hypotheses: inapparent exposures to blood/bodily fluids or transmission due to asymptomatic/mildly symptomatic carriers.
This study is in no way intended to be critical with the healthcare organizations which, thanks to their interventions, put an end to
a large EVD outbreak that threatened the regional and world populations.
1. Introduction
The West-African Ebola virus disease (EVD) 2014 outbreak
was longer and more impactful than previous Central-
African outbreaks, covering the largest geographic area,
spreading to eight countries across three continents and
lasting over 22 months [1]. Healthcare workers (HCWs)
bore the brunt of the outbreak with high morbidity and
mortality, were more likely to be infected than people in
the general population, and accounted for 5% of all EVD
cases [2, 3]. Nosocomial transmission was principally due
to the incorrect triage of EVD patients and limited or no
training on and limited availability and inappropriate use of
personal protective equipment (PPE). HCWs thus did not
always provide appropriate care to EVD patients, and some
were infected [2]. In general, infections occurred because of
low compliance with infection prevention and control (IPC)
procedures.
The massive intervention of WHO and governmental
and nongovernmental healthcare organizations from all over
the world, with resources and “train-the-trainer” policies,
improved this situation and the infectious risk among all
HCWs decreased considerably, thus demonstrating that EVD
infections among HCWs were preventable [2, 4, 5].
Nevertheless, some HCWs still got infected and, among
them, some HCWs were from Western countries. These
subjects likely complied with IPC standards, were aware of
the burden of the EVD epidemics, and had also less social
contacts with the members of the communities where they
were active [2].
Even before the occurrence of the 2014 West-African
outbreak, episodes of EVD transmission to HCWs from
Western countries had been reported.
In November 1976 the first case of a HCWwho developed
EVD outside Africa occurred, in a laboratory worker who
accidentally pricked his thumb while transferring homoge-
nized liver from a guinea-pig infected with Ebola virus. Fol-
lowing the standard safety protocol, he immediately removed
his gloves and immersed his damaged thumb in hypochlorite
solution, then squeezing it vigorously. There was no bleeding
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and careful examination did not reveal a puncture wound.
Nevertheless, he became EVD infected and was treated
with convalescent serum and within two weeks he showed
symptom remission and Ebola virus was no longer detected
in blood, urine, or faeces. Therefore, he was discharged from
isolation, but Ebola virus persisted in his semen for months
[6].
In November 1989, during an Ebola-Reston virus out-
break among monkeys in the Philippines, some infected ani-
mals were imported into the US, where five animal handlers
were daily exposed to these animals and four workers became
infected without symptoms. One of them recalled cutting his
fingerwhile performing a necropsy on an infected animal, but
among the remaining infected staff no transmission routewas
identified [7].
In 1995, during an Ebola virus outbreak in Kikwit
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), four Italian missionary
nurses developed EVD and three died (http://www
.nytimes.com/1995/05/12/world/virus-kills-a-3d-italian-nun-
at-zaire-hospital.html). There were no specific EVD-
transmission-based precautions in place at that time and
transmission through percutaneous exposures to infectious
blood was supposed but not confirmed [8].
These episodes suggest that the events that led to
Ebola virus infection could not always be known or
recalled. Thus, the aim of this study was to report the
anecdotal stories of some incidents occurring during the
West-African EVD outbreak to HCWs from Western
countries who did not recall any obvious contact of
broken skin or mucous membranes with blood/bodily
fluids of infected people or with surfaces and materials
contaminated with these fluids, which are the acknowledged
routes of human-to-human Ebola virus transmission
(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en) (http://
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/hospitals/infection-
control.html). This study is not a field investigation or
an epidemiologic study but was based on the interviews
released by the EVD victims and/or the reports provided
by the healthcare organizations. This was not a systematic
review, and there could be other episodes of infected
Western HCWs who could not recall the events that led to
transmission; however, these stories could help formulate
hypotheses regarding the existence and, possibly, the nature
of alternative transmission routes.
2. Methodology
In order to collect as much material as possible, we used con-
ventional and unconventional literature searches using the
keyword “Ebola” looking for interviews and reports released
by infected HCWs and/or the healthcare organizations from
Western countries during the West-African outbreak.
An orthodox literature search used the databanks
PubMed and Scopus. Full texts of relevant articles, according
to titles, abstracts, and keywords, were collected.
An unconventional article search was performed through
the Internet search engines (Google and Yahoo) using the
search terms “Ebola” and “healthcare worker”/“healthcare
provider”/“health worker” or the actual names of the known
infectedHCWs.Muchof the retrievedmaterial had been con-
structed from interviews with the infected HCWs obtained
from the healthcare organizations and from magazines and
newspapers.
The list of infected HCWs from Western countries
amassed was then reduced to cases of unknown/unrecalled
transmission routes in order to shed light over stories that
may help provide a direction to the future research regarding
Ebola virus transmission, rather than to evaluate EVD risk
factors, case-fatality, incidence, or mortality rates.
3. Results
The searches provided the stories of fourteenWestern HCWs
(Table 1). Although the reported material is public, their
names along with the names of the healthcare organizations
are not displayed.
(i) Three HCWs (A, B, and C) from the USA were
infected in Liberia between July and August 2014.
HCW-A, a doctor caring for EVD patients, fell ill
on 23 July 2014 and EVD was diagnosed four days
later. No information regarding potential routes of
transmission is available.HCW-B, a nursewhohadno
direct contact with EVD patients but assisted HCWs
with donning and doffing PPE and performing
decontamination, was diagnosedwith EVDon 27 July
(http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-out-
break/another-american-doctor-infected-ebola-cha-
rity-says-n193911) [9]. HCW-C, an obstetrician
working in Liberia, did not care for EVD patients
but was delivering babies following EVD-targeted
prevention protocols (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2745037/Third-U-S-missionary-51-inf-
ected-deadly-Ebola-virus-West-Africa-arrives-Nebra-
ska-treatment.html).
(ii) HCW-D, a UK nurse infected in Sierra Leone on 24
August 2014, spent fiveweeks caring for EVDpatients.
He and his colleagues could not recall any specific
accident that might lead to Ebola virus transmission
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ebola/
11072041/Ebola-victim-William-Pooley-discharged-
from-hospital.html).
(iii) HCW-E and HCW-F from Spain became infected
Between August and September 2014 in Sierra
Leone and were repatriated to Spain, where
they died from EVD on 12 August (HCW-E)
and 26 September (HCW-F). No information is
provided regarding transmission (http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/ebola-spanish-
missionary-dies-madrid-liberia) (http://www.thelocal
.es/20140926/madrid-spanish-missionary-dies-from-
ebola-spain).
(iv) HCW-G was a nurse infected at a Spanish Hospital
complex on 6 October 2014 while caring for one
of the above two HCWs (HCW-E and HCW-F).
She was the first HCW known to be infected
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Table 1: Profiles of HCWs fromWestern countries infected with Ebola virus during theWest-African outbreak who could not recall the route
of EVD transmission.
HCW
(country) HCW category Country of acquisition/diagnosis
Country of
hospitalization Probable transmission route
A (US) Doctor Liberia US N/A
B (US) Nurse Liberia US Did not care for EVD patients
C (US) Obstetrician Liberia US Did not care for EVD patients
D (UK) Nurse Sierra Leone UK
Used the prescribed PPE. Mistakes in
precautions due to overwork (colleagues’
opinion)
E (Spain)a N/A Sierra Leone Spain N/A
F (Spain)a N/A Sierra Leone Spain N/A
G (Spain) Nurse Spain Spain Classified as low Ebola risk. Used theprescribed PPE
H (Cuba) Doctor Sierra Leone Switzerland Used the prescribed PPE
I (US) Nurse US US Classified as low Ebola risk (complainedill-prepared hospital staff)
J (US) Nurse US US Classified as low Ebola risk (complainedill-prepared hospital staff)
K (US) Doctor Guinea (acquisition), US (diagnosis) US Used the prescribed PPE
L (Italy) Doctor Sierra Leone Italy Used the prescribed PPE
M (UK) Nurse Sierra Leone (acquisition), UK(diagnosis) UK Used the prescribed PPE
N (Italy) Nurse Sierra Leone (acquisition), Italy(diagnosis) Italy Used the prescribed PPE
aDied from EVD.
outside of West Africa. Paradoxically, during the
field investigation, among the 117 HCWs who had
participated in the care of the two infected HCWs,
HVW-G was classified as a “low-risk contact.” In
addition, she had always used appropriate PPE such
as waterproof long-sleeved clothing covering the feet,
waterproof footwear, hood, face mask or goggles,
double layer of gloves, and FP3 respirator and did
not recall any accident during PPE use. Questioned
as to how she may have contracted EVD, HCW-
G replied “I really can’t say, I haven’t the slightest
idea”(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/eur-
ope/spanish-nurse-teresa-romero-ramos-followed-all-
protocols-and-has-no-idea-how-she-contracted-ebola-
9781373.html) [10].
(v) HCW-H was one of hundreds of Cuban doctors
sent as to Sierra Leone. WHO provided rigor-
ous safety training and mentoring to the Cuban
Medical Brigade and other foreign medical teams
before starting work in the Ebola treatment cen-
tres. While working there, HCW-H contracted EVD
but declared “I don’t know how I got infected.
There was no violation of protocols” (http://www
.who.int/features/2015/cuban-doctor-survivor/en/).
(vi) HCW-I and HCW-J were US nurses who cared
for an EVD patient arriving from Liberia on 28
September 2014 who died from EVD on 8 October
in Dallas. HCW-I and HCW-J became infected
on 11 and 14 October, respectively, but did not
report unprotected exposures with the index
patients and had been categorized as low EVD
risk. How these two HCWs contracted Ebola virus
infection remains unknown [11]. They complained,
however, of having being obliged to have worked
at the hospital in chaotic surroundings with ill-
prepared nurses who received little guidance
on how to treat Ebola and protect themselves
(http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/nina-pham/).
(vii) HCW-K was a US doctor, who treated EVD patients
in Guinea. On 23 October 2014, nine days after
returning to the US, he was diagnosed with EVD.
He reported using all the prescribed PPE without
any known breach [12]. His charity investigation on
the transmission route was inconclusive. HCW-K
conjectured that the Ebola virus could be trapped
in a wet respiratory mask or that transmission
occurred the day he was accidentally poked in his
eye by the gloved finger of a hygienist without visible
traces of human biological fluids or when he was
feeding and cleaning a severely ill patient with EVD
(http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/craig-
spencer-after-ebola.html#).
(viii) HCW-L, a doctor from Italy working in Sierra
Leone, had an episode of vomiting and diarrhoea
with low fever on 20 November 2014, testing
positive for Ebola virus four days later. He was
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repatriated to Rome, hospitalized, and treated
[13]. Both the employer charity investigation and
HCW-L reported that he had been observing
correct procedures when treating infected patients
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30180345)
(details in Italian at http://www.ilpost.it/2015/02/10/
fabrizio-pulvirenti/).
(ix) HCW-M was a UK nurse who cared for EVD
patients in Sierra Leone. On December 2014,
on return home to Scotland, she became ill
and was diagnosed with EVD (http://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/uk-ebola-patient-
named-pauline-cafferkey- scottish-nurse). She was
transferred to London for care. A joint investigation
performed by the charity and the Centre for
Infectious Disease Surveillance and Control,
Public Health England concluded that there
was no conclusive evidence about when or how
she contracted EVD including the possibility
of infected social contacts. According to her
employing charity, “We will never be 100% sure
how HCW-M contracted Ebola” (http://www.save-
thechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/images/Significant
Event Review Summary Findings.pdf).
(x) HCW-N was an Italian nurse working in Sierra
Leone assisting EVD patients. Two days after
his return to Italy he fell ill and, two days later,
on 12 May 2015, was diagnosed with Ebola virus
infection. In an interview he reported to have
no idea on how transmission may have occurred
(http://www.sardiniapost.it/cronaca/stefano-maron-
giu-infermiere-guarito-da-ebola-non-mi-sono-mai-
sentito-solo/ in italian)
Of the fourteen reported Ebola virus-infected HCWs
from Western countries only two died from EVD.
The reason is almost certain: all the infected HCWs
were repatriated to USA or Europe, hospitalized, and
underwent intensive care treatments [9, 10, 13]. Indeed,
according to HCW-K, “whereas in Guinea I took care
of 30 patients, in the US 30 doctors took care of me”
(http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/craig-spencer-
after-ebola.html#).
4. Discussion
The common characteristics of the reported stories of these
HCWs fromWestern countries are that, excluding the single
case of HCW-D, whose colleagues suspected that he made
mistakes with transmission precautions due to overworking,
none of the remaining HCWs recalled any event that might
lead to Ebola virus transmission (Table 1) and epidemiologic
surveys failed to detect the transmission routes. Astonish-
ingly, some of these Western HCWs, such as HCW-B and C,
were not involved in the care of EVD patients. In addition,
HCWs were aware, trained, and equipped to prevent Ebola
virus infection transmission. We already demonstrated that
relatively high disease knowledge and awareness do not nec-
essarily lead to effective disease control and highlighted that
this apparent contrast is for reasons beyond the efficacy of
control measures but involve social, cultural, and behavioural
dimensions [14–17].
The observation that trained and equipped HCWs could
not recall the event that led to Ebola virus infection transmis-
sion leaves room for two major hypotheses.
Ebola virus transmission could be due to inapparent
exposures to infected blood or bodily fluids, an acknowledged
transmission route for other blood-borne pathogens, such as
HCV and HBV [18, 19].
Ebola virus transmission could be due to caring for
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic EVD carriers, an
hypothesis corroborated by several elements. First, Ebola
virus may persist at immunologically protected sites in the
body including semen, vaginal fluids, sweat, aqueous humor,
urine, and breast milk of convalescent patients for months
and, indeed, some convalescent patients have transmitted
the infection, suggesting an important role of convalescent
carriers in EVD persistence within the community [20].
Second, in endemic areas as many as 1–6% apparently healthy
individuals show high levels of serum anti-Ebola virus anti-
bodies, while 3–9% close family contacts of EVD patients
are infected without developing typical EVD symptoms [21].
Third, mildly symptomatic subjects could also have played
a role in infection transmission. Indeed, their prevalence
during theWest-African outbreak largely increased andmost
EVD survivors developed nonspecific EVD symptoms rather
than haemorrhagic disease [22].
As already reported, this is not an epidemiologic inves-
tigation nor an inspection, and therefore, it is not possible to
confirm that the EVD transmission route in these individuals
was truly through inapparent exposure and/or due to asymp-
tomatic/mildly symptomatic carriers. Even themore accurate
investigations during the EVD outbreak failed to identify the
exposures in more than one-fourth of infected patients [4]
and, more broadly, in all communicable disease outbreaks
there is always an important fraction of infected subjects with
unknown or unrecalled exposures [23].
Perhaps, knowledge about human-to-human EVD trans-
mission will improve thanks to experimental studies and
to observational studies focusing on infected individuals
without any obvious exposure [24], but the challenge is
exactly this, distinguishing between unrecalled and unknown
exposures to EVD.
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